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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the importance of social interactions in determining an individual’s choice to 
connect to an electrical grid, using an original dataset on a new rural electrification program in 
Ethiopia. Combining GPS information with random allocation of discount vouchers for 
connection to the grid, we show that neighbors’ connection behaviors have large effects on a 
household’s connection decision. This effect is also shown to decrease by distance: no peer 
effect is found for neighbors living farther than 100 meters away. Evidence also suggests that 
expectation interactions (through social learning of the benefits of electricity) or constraint 
interactions (through direct externalities of one’s connection on others’ wellbeing) are unlikely to 
fully account for these effects, and that preference interactions (through a ‘keeping up with 
neighbors’ type of mechanism) appear to be a plausible explanation. We discuss implications for 
further research and the design of development interventions.  
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1. Motivation 
Social interaction effects concern to the extent to which an individual’s decision to adopt a 
particular behavior is in part driven by the behavior of (relevant) others, above and beyond 
market-driven influences. The magnitude and underlying mechanisms of such effects bear 
significant consequences for public policies. Depending on their size, social interaction effects 
may contribute to high or low adoption equilibrium of particular commodities, technologies, or 
behavior. Depending on their underlying mechanisms, they may necessitate different policies to 
reach certain adoption equilibrium. 
 
Social interaction effects are likely to be present even in poor settings. It is striking, for instance, 
that mobile phone penetration into countries such as Kenya, Niger, or Haiti has far exceeded 
expectations (Aker and Mbiti 2010), and some authors point to the importance of peer influence 
on individuals’ decisions to purchase a cell phone (e.g. Kreutzer 2009, Makgosa and Mohube 
2007, Yang, He and Lee 2007, Aboagye 2013). In turn, and following Manski (2000), these 
effects may result from constraint interactions, wherein others’ cell phone ownership may affect 
one’s own capacity to make phone calls; expectation interactions, wherein seeing others using 
their cell phone allows one to learn more about the benefits of having one; or preference 
interactions, wherein cell phone ownership carries some social value that may (partly) drive 
one’s adoption. Thus, depending on the underlying mechanism, policies such as subsidies, 
information campaigns, or social marketing may lead to very different adoption equilibriums. 
 
This paper tests for the presence of social interaction effects on households’ decision to connect 
to a newly installed electrical grid in rural Ethiopia and attempts to identify the underlying 
factors at work. At a time when rural electrification is being promoted throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa, understanding households’ connection decisions has led to significant debates (see 
Bernard (2010) for a review). The study’s setting is arguably ideal, as no electricity was 
available in the surveyed communities when we collected baseline data and electrical lines were 
installed in the community shortly thereafter. Connection to the grid is expensive, however, and 
only a proportion of the sampled households chose to connect to the grid over the following 12 
months.  
 
Identifying social interaction effects requires the neutralization of other factors that may also 
produce homogenous behavior among peers (Manski, 1993). For instance, one may observe 
similar connection rates among neighbors because they face similar connection prices or because 
households with similar economic means tend to live in the same locations. Thus, our study 
relies on the random allocation of non-transferable vouchers that provided a discount on 
connection to the grid, as well as household-level GPS locations. Connection price being an 
important driver of a household’s choice to connect, the vouchers provide an exogenous 
variation in the number of connected neighbors within a particular distance radius, allowing us to 
identify social multipliers effects (see Kremer and Miguel (2007), Dupas (2010), and Devoto et 
al. (2011) for similar approaches).  
 
Our results show that neighbors’ connection behavior has large effects on a household’s 
connection decision. This effect also decreases by distance, with no peer effect found for 
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neighbors living farther than 100 meters away, leading to sub-village clusters of high/low density 
of electrified households. 
 
Our data does not allow us to directly test for the mechanisms underlying the identified social 
interaction effect; however, indirect evidence suggests that expectations interactions, wherein 
households learn from connected neighbors about the benefits of electricity, are not the main 
driver. In fact, we find even higher social interaction effects in the subsample of households with 
the highest knowledge of electricity at baseline. Further, there is no evidence of electricity’s 
benefits in the short run of the study, in terms of either productive use or changes in time 
allocation – such as study time or time necessary to collect fuel wood. There is also no evidence 
of a reduction in energy bills given the number of available and more affordable (though lower-
quality) substitutes for electrical lights. Finally, given the program design, it is unlikely that 
households could learn from others ‘how’ to obtain connection. Thus, it appears unlikely that 
individuals’ connection decisions are being driven by increased knowledge about the benefits of 
electricity. 
 
The study’s field setting also allows for only limited constraint interactions, wherein households 
would benefit from or be constrained by others’ connection decisions. The connection price is 
fixed by the electrical utility company and cannot be reduced by a higher number of neighbors 
simultaneously connecting to the grid. In addition, the main electrical implements used are light-
bulbs, which are readily available and which price is unlikely to be affected by local demand. 
Finally, one could argue that enhanced lighting in electrified households generates negative 
externalities on non-connected ones, for instance through more frequent visits to the former at 
the expense of the latter. Yet no such effect is found in households’ time allocated to entertaining 
visitors.  
 
With limited expectation and constraint interactions (at least in the short time-span of the study), 
preference interactions offer a reasonable explanation for the social interaction effect observed. 
Households’ electrification status is readily observable by all neighbors through the drop-down 
wire that connects a house to the nearest electrical pole, directly enabling social comparisons. 
And while our data does not allow us to directly test for such effects, a number of case studies in 
various other contexts suggest that electrification often carries a social status dimension in rural 
communities. Accordingly, individuals are often willing to invest significant resources in order 
to keep up with neighbors’ social status. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a short description of the 
institutional setting of the study, the study design, and the experimental integrity of the data 
collected. In Section 3, we develop the empirical strategy used to identify social interaction 
effects in connection behavior, which is applied in Section 4. Section 5 further assesses the 
respective plausibility of underlying drivers for the observed social interaction effect, namely 
expectation interactions, constraint interactions, and preference interactions. Section 6 concludes 
and discusses further research needs and potential policy implications. 
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2. Study Setting 
With less than one percent of households having access to electricity in the early 2000s, Ethiopia 
has one of the lowest rural electrification rates in the world (Estache and Fay, 2007). Since 2005, 
however, the Universal Energy Access Program (UEAP) has sought to dramatically change the 
scenery, starting with new electricity supply to 1,000 non-electrified villages. Within each 
selected village, households were responsible for the costs of connecting to the main electrical 
line; these expenses included the cost of installing a drop-down line from the nearest pole and the 
cost of installing a meter. Overall, connection prices ranged from around 300-450 Ethiopian birr 
(ETB) among connected households in our sample,1 depending on a house’s distance to the 
nearest pole. For comparison purposes, per capita monthly food expenditure was evaluated at 
less than 150 ETB during this time period. 
 
As part of a broader effort to measure and understand barriers to electrical connectivity, the 
present study relies on an experiment in which discount vouchers of 10 and 20 percent were 
randomly allocated to households in eight selected village communities in Southern Ethiopia that 
were soon to be electrified under the UEAP program. In each village, the allocation of vouchers 
was done at random through a clear and transparent public lottery based on administrative village 
listings. The voucher design itself was rather complex, involving watermarks, official stamps, 
and unique serial numbers to reduce the risk of falsification. In addition, clear instructions 
regarding the non-transferability of the vouchers were given both in writing and orally, and each 
recipient’s name, national identification number, and address were written on the voucher at the 
time of distribution. 2  
 
In each village, 90 households were randomly selected for a survey at the time of the lottery; 
some of these households were then further selected to receive a voucher. Of the households 
selected, however, we later found that a number lived too far from the upcoming grid to be 
considered for electrification. Overall, our effective sample varies from 68–89 households per 
village, which corresponds to roughly 10 percent of the average village population and is 
representative of all households which were effectively given the choice to connect to the newly 
installed grid. Within these households, an average 65 percent were provided with a discount 
voucher. A follow-up survey was conducted 12 months after baseline.  
 
For each household, survey questionnaires included the standard set of demographic and income-
consumption expenditure modules, along with specific modules dedicated to energy usage. We 
also collected the GPS location of each household’s compound to further assess the distance to 
the nearest electrical pole and hence proxy connection prices.  
 
As shown in the first panel of Table 1, the random selection of households to receive a voucher 
was fairly well executed, such that no differences in the basic characteristics of voucher 
recipients and non-recipients were found at baseline. Further, we find no significant differences 
between voucher recipients and non-recipients in terms of households’ initial knowledge of the 
                                                 
1 Roughly equivalent at the time of our baseline survey to US$30–45. 
2 The lottery itself was conducted by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo) with which the study was 
implemented. See Bernard and Torero (2011) for further description of the experiment. 
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benefits of electricity,3 in baseline time allocation, or in mean distance to the nearest electrical 
pole. Finally, the spatial distribution of vouchers was not geographically clustered—a point of 
importance for the following analyses—as shown by the distribution’s independence from the 
density of housing around an individual’s house. 
3. Identification of Social Interaction Effects 
To empirically identify social interaction effects, it is useful to first build on the general insights 
of existing models. A valuable starting point is the approach of Granovetter (1978), who 
proposes a threshold model in which an individual’s decision to undertake a particular action 
depends on the number of others who have decided to undertake that same action in previous 
periods. In this model, each individual is defined by a different threshold level.  
 
In this model, social interaction effects will lead to a type of bandwagon dynamic under two 
conditions. The trend must first be started by individuals who are willing to engage in a 
particular behavior without knowing either others’ past actions or others’ eventual future 
decisions. In an analogy with the treatment effect literature, these low-threshold individuals may 
be referred to as the always takers. The bandwagon dynamic then requires that the distribution of 
thresholds among compliers (those who need to observe others’ behavior before deciding on 
their own) must be continuous enough so that each additional individual adopting the behavior 
will trigger the decision of one or more additional individuals to do so. The bandwagon will 
effectively stop either when large gaps exist within the threshold distribution or when the only 
remaining individuals are those who would never engage in the said behavior, whatever others’ 
choices (the never-takers).  
 
Importantly, however, Granovetter (1978) argues that not all individuals exert the same influence 
over others. For instance, the social influence of a friend may be larger than that of a stranger; 
similarly, it may be easier to derive information from observing a neighbor’s behavior than from 
observing the behavior of someone farther away geographically. This idea is also discussed in 
Brock and Durlauf (2001), who distinguish between global interactions, in which the same 
weight is given to all population members, and local interactions, in which individuals within 
one’s geographic or social vicinity are given greater weight (see also Moffitt, 2001). In a 
somewhat related vein, Akerlof (1997) uses a gravity model to describe how individuals may 
trade—that is, in a social interaction perspective—more with individuals who are ‘close by’ with 
respect to their lifestyle. The distribution of these interaction weights may then produce 
subcultures, whereby clusters of particular behavior are observed within a given community. In 
places with scattered populations, social interactions effects will be weak and no such 
bandwagon dynamic will be observed.  
 
Applied to the case of rural electrification, two separate propositions can be extracted from these 
general models. First, bandwagon dynamics will be triggered by those individuals for whom the 
intrinsic value of electricity is a sufficient incentive to connect to the electrical grid, whatever 
others’ behavior. Second, social interaction effects may depend on one’s ability to observe 
others’ connection behavior or to be affected by their behavior, which may diminish with the 
                                                 
3 This variable is further described in Section 5.1. 
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geographic distance between households. Thus, for a given threshold, a household may adopt a 
different connection behavior based on the distribution of always takers, never takers, and 
compliers within that household’s vicinity. This effect, in turn, may lead to the existence of sub-
community clusters of high or low connection rates. Finally, it should be noted that at this stage, 
expectation interactions, constraint interactions, and preference interactions are all equally 
likely to be the underlying driver of the bandwagon dynamic.  
 
For illustrative purposes, and as preliminary evidence of the presence of social interaction effects 
in electrical connection decisions, Figure 1 maps households’ locations, along with their 
connection status and their distance to the electrical line, in one of the eight villages under study. 
The picture reveals a number of clusters of connected (black) and unconnected (white) 
households. These clusters do not a priori bear a clear relationship to households’ distance to the 
electrical line, which, as noted earlier, significantly affects connection prices. Finally, these 
clusters mostly correspond to households that are located less than 200 meters from one another. 
 
Several additional factors may explain this connection pattern, apart from genuine social 
interaction effects (cf Manski, 1993). First, the composition of physical clusters is endogenous: 
individuals in these clusters may behave in common ways because they share similar attributes 
that drove both their location choice in the past as well as their current decision to connect or not 
connect to the electrical grid. Second, households within clusters are exposed to similar contexts 
and contextual changes and may react to them accordingly. Finally, cluster members may 
genuinely influence one another through social interactions, either through their exogenous 
characteristics—the so-called exogenous effect—or through their actual connection behavior—
endogenous effects. As discussed elsewhere (Manski, 1993, 2000; Moffitt, 2001; Scheinkman, 
2008; and others), only endogenous effects are prone to generate the kind of social multiplier that 
may explain large differences across clusters when there are no significant differences in 
underlying fundamentals. 
 
The so-called reflection problem, formalized in Manski (1993), poses yet another challenge to 
the empirical identification of endogenous social interaction effects. Since group behavior is 
simultaneously influenced by individual behavior, simple linear-in-means models, whereby an 
individual’s action is regressed on the prevalence of this action within the group, cannot 
distinguish between exogenous and endogenous social interaction effects. Non-experimental 
solutions have been proposed, including the addition of further exclusion restrictions to the 
model and the reliance on nonlinearities, which allow for multiple equilibriums (for example, 
Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Blume and Durlauf, 2005). Other potential solutions rely on models in 
which one’s behavior varies with lagged group outcomes under the assumption that “nonsocial 
forces act contemporaneously but social forces act on the individual with a lag” (Manski, 1993, 
p540). Finally, experimental settings provide promising identification avenues, exogenously 
affecting either group membership (for example, Sacerdote, 2001; Katz, Kling, and Liebman, 
2001) or the behavior of some individuals within existing groups (for example, Duflo and Saez, 
2003).  
 
Our approach is akin to the latter, whereby randomly selected households within village 
communities were provided discount vouchers as an extra incentive to connect to the electrical 
grid. Given the importance of connection cost to households’ connection decision, voucher 
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recipients are more likely to have connected over the course of the study than their fellow 
villagers who did not win the lottery. The randomness of the voucher allocation among an 
individual’s peers ensures independence from that individual’s observable and unobservable 
characteristics. Our study is thus a partial population experiment, whereby “there exists an 
exogenous variable that affects one individual directly but affects the other only through the 
endogenous social interaction” (Moffit 2001, p. 59). 
 
An additional issue relates to the definition of groups themselves. As reminded by Manski 
(1993), researchers must first know how individuals form reference groups and perceive 
reference group outcomes before they can infer social interactions. In this paper, we take a rather 
exploratory approach to the definition of a reference group: we investigate the extent to which 
reference groups evolve with distance.  Our data allows us to identify the level of social 
interaction effects for various definitions of a geographical neighborhood by changing the 
distance radius that is considered to select one’s neighbors (see Kremer and Miguel, 2007; 
Dupas, 2010; Devoto et al., 2011 for similar approaches). A caveat, however, is that group 
membership itself does not change quickly relative to the influence of social interactions (Moffit, 
2001). In our case, this means that housing location will not change as a result of group-level 
connection behavior. The time span of our study is relatively short, however, and it is highly 
unlikely that housing location changed over the course of the 12 month study. A second caveat is 
that one’s reference group may be only partially correlated with the physical distribution of one’s 
neighbors, such that our measure is at best a proxy. 
  
Adapting Manski’s (1993) setting to our purpose, our estimation can be described as 
 
ܿ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ. ܿ̅ି ௜∈ௗ௜ ൅ ߜ. ݄ௗ௜	൅	ݖ௜ᇱ߬ ൅ ݑ௜																																ሺ1ሻ 
 
where ܿ is a binary outcome indicating whether a household has connected to the grid over the 
12 months of the study; ݀݅ characterizes one’s reference group, which in this case is a distance 
radius around one’s house; ܿ̅ି ௜∈ௗ௜ measures the number of neighbors connected to the grid within ݀ meters from i’s house; ሺݖ, ݑሻ are observable and non-observable attributes of the household 
that directly affect ܿ (such as wealth, connection price, and preferences); and ݄ controls for the 
population density within the radius. In fact, one may argue that the distribution of connected 
households somewhat follows the geographic distribution of households in general, which could 
lead to the incorrect interpretation that the coefficients reveal social interaction effects. 
 
The parameter ߚ is meant to capture endogenous social interactions—namely, the extent to 
which an individual’s connection behavior is influenced by the connection decision of other 
households living within a ݀-meter geographical radius. As discussed earlier, ߚ may well capture 
a variety of other reasons as to why neighboring households tend to behave in similar ways, 
resulting in a potentially biased estimate of ߚ.  
 
The study design, however, allows us to circumvent this issue by using the exogenous number of 
voucher recipients within the vicinity as a valid instrument for the number of connected 
households.  Equations (2), (3) and (4) summarize our empirical strategy. 
 
ܿ௜ ൌ ߙᇱ ൅ ߚᇱ. ̅ݒି௜∈ௗ௜൅	ߜ′. ݄ௗ௜ ൅ ݖ௜ᇱ߬ᇱ ൅ ݑ௜,																															ሺ2ሻ 
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ܿ̅ି ௜∈ௗ௜ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ. ̅ݒି௜∈ௗ௜ ൅ 	ܿ. ݄ௗ௜ ൅ ݖ௜′݀ ൅ ߤ௜,																											ሺ3ሻ 
 
ܿ௜ ൌ ߙ′′ ൅ ߚ′′. ܿ̂ି௜∈ௗ௜ ൅ ߜ′′. ݄ௗ௜	൅	ݖ௜ᇱ߬′′ ൅ ݑ௜																												ሺ4ሻ 
 
 
Accordingly, ߚᇱ in Equation (2) captures the reduced form coefficient of the experiment, while 
Equation (3) describes the first stage of the Two-Stage Least Square estimate of the social 
interaction effect described in Equation (4), in which ܿ̂ି௜∈ௗ௜ is the predicted value of ܿ̅ି ௜∈ௗ௜ 
obtained from Equation (3). 
4. Results 
Results of the reduced form, the first stage, and the second stage estimations described in 
Equations (2), (3), and (4) are reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively. For each, we use GPS 
coordinates to report estimates when considering distance radiuses of 10, 30, 50, and up to 500 
meters. Thus, within each panel of each table, each column relates to an independent estimate 
corresponding to a particular size of radius. For comparison and robustness purposes, Panel A in 
each table reports the estimated results without any controls, while population density in the 
considered radius is added in Panel B and further household-level characteristics are added in 
Panel C. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the reduced form estimates of Equation 2. Accordingly, the 
number of voucher recipients within one’s vicinity has a rather strong effect on a household’s 
decision to connect when we consider small radiuses; this effect eventually disappears after 200 
meters. According to Panel C, each additional household that received a voucher within a 30 
meter radius increases the probability that an individual will connect by close to 2 percentage 
points. With an average connection rate of 41 percent, this result suggests a close to 4% increase 
in the connection rate for each additional connected neighbor within a 30 meter radius. For 100 
meters or more, the influence is reduced to 0.3 percentage points before it becomes statistically 
insignificant.  
 
The results are rather consistent across all three panels. Comparing Panel A and Panel B, we find 
that controlling for population density does have a downward effect on the estimate, although the 
general magnitude remains unchanged. Results from Panel C also confirm the existence and size 
of the social interaction effect. The results overall confirm important determinants of 
households’ connection decisions, as documented in existing literature on rural electrification in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Heltberg (2003) showed that in Ghana and South Africa, 
fewer than 5 percent of rural households in the lowest revenue quintile connected to electricity, 
while this rate reached between 25–50 percent for the highest quintile. Our results are very much 
in line with these findings, showing that one’s distance to the nearest electrical pole is negatively 
related to one’s connection decision, whereas indicators of wealth are positively related. In turn, 
receiving a 20 percent discount voucher increases one’s connection probability by close to 15 
percentage points.  
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In Table 3, we report the first stage estimates described in Equation (3). Clearly, a strong and 
somewhat constant relationship is found between the number of connected households within a 
given radius and the number of voucher recipients within that radius. The relationship is robust 
to the introduction of population density and household-level characteristics as controls. Overall, 
results from these first stage estimates combined with the random distribution of the vouchers 
provide strong support to our instrumental variable strategy described in the previous section. 
 
Table 4 displays the results from these instrumental variable estimates. The results are somewhat 
similar in magnitude to those obtained from the reduced form in Table 2. Here also, while 
population density and household-level characteristics do contribute to explaining households’ 
connection decisions, they do not affect the main social effect results identified. Accordingly, 
each additional connected household within a 30 meter radius increases the connection rate by 
2.4 percentage points. This relationship vanishes beyond a 100 meter radius, in line with the type 
of clusters reported in Figure 1. 
 
As pictured in Figure 1, these social interaction effects may help explain the existence of clusters 
of connected and unconnected households within a given community. Here also, results are in 
line with results derived elsewhere in the literature. For instance, in their study of 27 villages in 
Botswana, Ketlogetswe, Mothudi, and Mothibi (2007) found important differences in connection 
rates across nearby and similar villages, ranging from 2 percent in some villages to 27 percent in 
others, that cannot be fully explained by village- and household-level characteristics. 
5. Interpretation 
Social interaction effects may result from various types of mechanisms. In particular, and as 
proposed in Manski (2000), these mechanism may belong to three separate categories. First, 
constraint interactions are based on the fact that one’s behavior may affect (positively or 
negatively) others’ constraints in adopting such behavior. Second, expectation interactions rely 
on the fact that by observing others’ behavior and the corresponding results, one obtains more 
information regarding the potential benefits of these actions. Such interactions are more often 
framed as social learning. Finally, preference interactions characterize those situations in which 
individuals’ preferences for a particular set of actions depend on the actions chosen by others for 
reasons more related to social status, such as attempting to keep up with neighbors’ behavior.  
 
Understanding the extent to which such types of mechanisms drive social interaction effects can 
in turn greatly affect the design of economic policies. For instance, enhancing access to 
information about the benefits of a given program may affect the existence or magnitude of 
expectation interactions, but should not affect those social interaction effects driven by 
preference interactions (see Manski, 2000).While our data does not allow for a direct test of 
these mechanisms, a range of evidence can be used to assess the plausibility of each 
mechanism’s respective contribution to the effect identified in the previous section.  
 
5.1.Expectation Interactions 
 
We first investigate whether the expectation interactions mechanism is a plausible explanation 
for the social interaction effect we observe. The social learning explanation often appears as the 
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default explanation in economic studies. For instance, Devotto et al. (2011) find that neighbors’ 
connection to piped water in urban Morocco has a significant effect on individuals’ behavior; 
they attribute this effect to the fact that households “could have learned from their neighbors 
about the benefit of being connected”. In the context of our study, it could thus be hypothesized 
that i) people learn from neighbors about the benefits of electricity, ii) they learn from neighbors 
about the extent of these benefits, or iii) they find out how to get connected to the electrical grid 
through observing their neighbors. We assess the plausibility of these hypotheses below. 
 
First, and despite the rural locations of the surveyed communities, our data suggests a rather high 
knowledge of the benefits of electricity at baseline - that is, before any electrical lines were 
installed in the community. Households were asked to rate their degree of agreement with a 
number of statements describing the potential advantages and disadvantages of the use of 
electricity, wood, and kerosene to perform everyday activities. As reported in Column 1 of Table 
5, the overwhelming majority of respondents strongly agreed with most of the advantages of 
electricity listed in Panel 1, while a much weaker proportion agreed with disadvantages of 
electricity listed in Panel 2. In comparison, respondents reported little agreement with positive 
statements regarding the use of kerosene and wood but widely agreed with the disadvantages 
presented for these fuels. In general, kerosene is perceived as expensive and inappropriate for 
lighting or cooking, while kerosene fumes are considered toxic. Results for wood show that 
although it may provide better taste when used for cooking food, wood is scarce, contributes to 
deforestation, and is relatively expensive when purchased from the market. The majority of 
respondents also mentioned the important health hazards caused by smoke from wood 
combustion within the house. Column 2 provides further indications about households’ intrinsic 
valuation of electricity. As reported in Panel 1, electricity is essentially seen as a substitute for 
kerosene when used for illumination. Accordingly, electricity is thought to provide better 
lighting and lower health hazards than the former, though Panel 2 also highlights households’ 
fear of potential electrical accidents. In sum, we find that households were rather well informed 
about the potential advantages and disadvantages of electrification, in contrast with Ranganathan 
(1993), for whom low connection rates are partly related to households’ limited knowledge of 
electricity. In addition, our results show that electricity is by far the favorite energy source of 
most households.  
 
As further evidence of the limited explanatory power of social learning in this context, Table 6 
presents estimates of the social interaction effect identified previously on the sub-sample of 
households with the highest perception of electrical benefits at baseline and on the sub-sample of 
households with a slightly lower, although still high, perception of these benefits. Panel A shows 
estimates similar to those seen in Panel C of Table 4, in this case applied to the sub-sample of 
households that responded “strongly agree” to all statements displayed in Panel 1 of Table 5. 
Lower estimates would have indicated that at least part of the social interaction effect observed is 
due to the social learning phenomenon, or expectation interpretation. Our results, however, 
suggest greater estimates for households with the initially highest perception of electricity’s 
benefits. We also find no effect on the sample of less-informed households in Panel B, 
effectively suggesting that little social learning regarding electricity’s benefits affects 
households’ connection decisions. In other words, while learning about the benefits of electricity 
may have occurred among neighbors, it seems to have had limited consequences on households’ 
decisions regarding whether or not to connect to the electrical grid.  
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One may argue, however, that while respondents may have known about electricity’s benefits in 
general, they may have learned the actual extent of those benefits from observing their 
neighbors. For this to be the case, the magnitude of these benefits must be relatively significant if 
they are to trigger neighbors’ adoption. Yet in the present context, the data suggests rather 
limited observable benefits, at least in the short time span of the study. As Table 7 reports, we 
observed low levels of productive electricity use by electrified households. Eighty-seven percent 
of connected households’ installation does not allow for more than four light bulbs; in 95 percent 
of cases, it allows for fewer than three sockets. In our sample, only one household had an 
electrical installation capable of powering a refrigerator, a motor, or a water heater. Under such 
conditions, the productive uses of electricity are restricted to those derived from better lighting 
within the house. Yet the data also suggests that the majority of households’ electrical lighting is 
used for activities that are not directly productive, such as reading, studying, cooking, etc. Thus,  
the use of electric lights for productive purposes is only marginal (Table 8). This is not to say 
that electricity does not affect households’ allocation of resources and time in the longer run, but 
that in the relatively short time span of this study, such effects are unlikely to be observable by 
peers.4   
 
Clearly, the benefits of electricity may also be derived from changes in time allocated to study or 
leisure activities. To assess the importance of such effects, Table 9 reports estimates of 
electricity’s impact on households’ time allocation. For each surveyed household, we collected 
diary-based measures of the time spent on various activities for up to four individuals, including 
a male adult, a female adult, and two children.5 Column 1 reports simple OLS estimates, while 
Column 2 relies on Two-Stage Least Square estimates in which the random allocation of 
vouchers is used as an excluded instrument for a household’s decision to connect. Overall, our 
results indicate no apparent effect of electrification on time allocation over the course of the 
study. (It should be noted, however, that such effects may well be present in the longer run, so 
the results presented in Table 9 may reflect the fact that households simply do not adjust 
immediately to their new electrified status.) The findings in Tables 7-9 suggest that the 
observable short run benefits of electrification were not significant, thus making it unlikely that 
households decided to connect based on observations of their neighbors’ benefits.  
 
Finally, one may argue that individuals could learn from their neighbors about the steps, price, 
and procedures necessary to connect to the electrical grid. This argument follows the 
experimental design of Devotto et al. (2011), who use a door-to-door awareness and facilitation 
campaign to inform households about the availability of interest-free loan for connection to 
piped water, as well as application procedure for those loans. In our context, such learning about 
procedures appears limited. In the surveyed communities, EEPCo (Ethiopia’s national power 
utility) proceeds along the following steps. First, the main electrical line is installed in the 
village, usually following the main roads. Once the line is installed and ready to operate, the 
utility sets up a shop in the community that will stay in place for at least a few years. EEPCo 
then announces in a public meeting that registration is open; at this point, each interested 
                                                 
4 For instance, Dinkleman (2011) finds that rural electrification led to higher participation of women to labor 
markets in South Africa. 
5 See Juster and Staffor (1991) for a lengthy discussion on appropriate means to collect time allocation data. 
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household head can indicate, by paying ETB 10, that the household is potentially interested in 
connecting to the grid. The cost of connection depends in part on the length of the drop-down 
wire from the nearest pole and the suitability of the house to be electrified. For those households 
that have registered, EEPCo inspectors estimate the total connection costs that the households 
will have to pay. Provided that the household can cover these costs, a contract is signed and 
electricity is installed. Overall, it seems rather clear for any households living in these (small) 
village communities that becoming connected implies visiting the only electrical utility shop that 
is permanently based in the village. This is reinforced by the various public announcements 
made by the electric utility – including announcements made at the time of the public lottery for 
voucher distribution.  
 
In sum, the available evidence suggests that learning from others about electrification’s 
important benefits, or about the procedures to obtain electrical connection, is unlikely to explain 
the relatively large social interaction effects identified in the previous section. In other words, 
while learning from others may have occurred, it is unlikely that it had strong effects on 
households’ decision to connect to the electrical grid over the course of this study. 
 
5.2.Constraint Interactions 
 
In the present context, constraint interactions would arise if a household’s connection generated 
positive or negative externalities on others, which may in turn affect those others’ connection 
decisions. This could occur through different avenues. First, a higher demand for connection 
could affect the connection price. In fact, while the connection price is fixed nationally by the 
national electric utility, one may argue that nearby households could share fixed connection 
costs, whereby one house is electrified through EEPCo (the electric utility) and its neighbors 
later connect to the grid informally—the so-called spiderwebs that are commonly observed in 
many poor communities. In the present context, however, such features were not observed, in 
large part because an EEPCo office was permanently installed in each community to provide 
formal connections and prevent illegal ones. Another price effect could also exist if the price of 
electrical implements was affected by the level of demand triggered by the number of households 
connecting to the electrical grid. In our context, however, the only essential implements were 
light bulbs, which EEPCo made readily available to all connected households.  
 
It could also be argued that a household’s connection entails negative externalities on others if, 
for instance, visitors (friends, relatives, or others) would converge toward electrified houses and 
no longer visit the non-electrified ones. This could suggest that having more connected neighbors 
might push households to connect as well in order to not lose acquaintances. However, as we 
found that electrification has limited effects households’ time spent entertaining visitors (see 
previous section), such effects are unlikely. Finally, it could also be argued that positive 
externalities exist, whereby one household’s connection to electricity also benefits others (for 
example, by allowing children to go study in the neighbors’ electrified house or allowing 
someone recharge their cell phone using their neighbor’s connection). While we cannot rule out 
such effects, their presence would imply a negative relationship between a household’s 
probability to connect and that household’s neighbors’ connection status, such that our effects 
constitute a lower bound on the effective positive influence. 
 
5.3.Preference Interactions 
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Lastly, we turn to what Manski (2000) refers to as preference interactions, whereby the search 
for conformity or social status contributes to households’ decision to connect to the electrical 
grid in order to either differentiate themselves from their peers or to keep up with their peers. 
Such a phenomenon has long been documented in the consumption literature, in particular in the 
late 1940s in the US when “systems of ascribed social status and social stratification were 
breaking down or had effectively disappeared” (Mason 2000).6 Such social comparisons are also 
likely to be relevant in developing countries today as traditional norms of consumption and 
technology-adoption behavior are gradually eroded under the influence of population pressure, 
market penetration, and access to global media (Platteau, 2006). In fact, some evidence can be 
found in the rather voluminous literature on relative consumption and subjective well-being, in 
which keeping up with one’s neighbor is a strong determinant of consumption choices (see 
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) or Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a review). Finally, social 
comparisons may also explain, at least in part, the apparent paradox described in Banerjee and 
Duflo (2007), whereby otherwise food-limited households in various countries spend a 
significant amount of (needed) resources on such items as festivals and other visible 
consumption items. 
 
Rural electrification in African communities may well be subject to this type of effect. For 
instance, in rural Kenya, Abdullah and Jeanty (2011) found evidence of a sort of class distinction 
between those who have and those who do not have electricity; in Ghana, Abavana (2000) 
reported an elevated social status for those who did connect to electricity. Finally, in Zambia, 
Gustavsson (2002) found that clients of a solar program reported feeling that their life had 
become more urban-like. Similar anecdotal evidence was reported during fieldwork in the 
present study, whereby the wire connecting a house to the nearest pole became an important 
topic of discussion in the village. Finally, one may argue that, given the limited geographical 
scope of the identified bandwagon effect—about 100 meters—and in the absence of spider-web 
connections, preference interactions appear as the most plausible explanation for the observed 
social interaction effects.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Measurement of social interaction effects can help explain high or low adoption rates of a 
particular behavior among individuals or households within communities. In turn, understanding 
the mechanisms underlying these effects can further inform the design of policies meant to 
prevent or encourage behavior changes. For instance, expectation interactions may call for 
information campaigns, constraint interactions may require subsidy programs, and preference 
interactions may suggest the use of tools such as social marketing. It is worth noting that 
marketing companies are well aware of these different effects and routinely design adapted 
promotional campaigns to trigger them.  
 
Development programs, however, are yet to develop the kind of tools that take advantage of 
potentially powerful social interaction effects. One reason for this lies in the limited knowledge 
                                                 
6 E.g. Morgenstern (1948), Duesenberry (1949),  Modigliani (1949) or Leibenstein (1950), 
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of these effects’ magnitude and underlying mechanisms, in part related to their difficult empirical 
identification. In this paper, we use an arguably ideal empirical setting to estimate the size of 
social interaction effects on households’ decision to connect to a rural electrification grid in 
Ethiopia, combined with an assessment of the most plausible explanation for these effects. 
Connection rates in rural electrification programs are typically low, despite the potentially 
important demand found even in poor settings. For instance, studies in various countries have 
found that the proportion of connected households in grid-electrified villages is as low as 12 
percent in Botswana (Ketlogetswe, Mothudi, and Mothibi, 2007), 30 percent in Senegal (ESMAP 
2007), and 5 percent in a solar electrification scheme in Kenya (Jacobson, 2007). At the same 
time, and according to a recent UNICEF study, rural households in Nigeria ranked electricity as 
their second priority, after safe water but before health centers, roads, education, and fertilizers 
(ESMAP, 2005).  
 
While our purpose is not to promote policy tools to encourage or discourage households’ 
electrification, our study provides first-hand evidence of the importance of social interaction 
effects in explaining connection rates. In particular, we show that each additional neighbor 
connected within a 30 meter radius increases a household’s connection probability by about 2 
percentage points. Interestingly, our findings are very much in line with Devoto et al. (2011), 
who find that connection to piped water in urban Morocco is in part determined by neighbors’ 
connections and that these effects decrease with neighbors’ distance from one another.  
 
By suggesting that preference interactions are an important part of the explanation, our results 
carry further policy lessons. For instance, recent debates on so-called smart subsidies propose 
that consumption subsidies for promoted goods should be specifically targeted to those 
households that cannot afford the good’s face value (see Barnes, D., and J. Halpern (2000) for a 
discussion related to rural electrification). Yet other evidence suggests that even when important 
items such as deworming pills are provided for free, take-up remains low in developing countries 
(Kremer and Miguel, 2007). The existence of preference interactions may call for policies aimed 
at generating the type of critical mass necessary to trigger social interactions effects.  
 
Since our data does not allow us to perform rigorous empirical tests of this hypothesis, we can 
only suggest the presence of such preference interaction effects. The potential importance of 
these effects for policy design therefore calls for rigorous qualitative insights to be collected (as 
suggested in Manski, 2000) or empirical studies specifically designed for the purpose. To our 
knowledge, only Banerjee et al. (2011) provide convincing empirical identification of the 
mechanisms underlying social interaction effects, using detailed social network analysis within a 
randomized control trial design. Investigating participation rates in a microfinance program in 
southern India, they find no peer effect over and above that of information transmission, 
suggesting that expectation interactions dominate in this case. Further research along these lines 
is warranted. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1—Experimental integrity 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Voucher = 0 Voucher = 1 Difference: 
p-value 
      
Panel 1. Households’ Baseline Characteristics     
Consumption expenditures (*1,000 ETB) 6.34 4.03 6.11 6.44 0.32 
Age of household head 41.6 14.92 40.76 42.17 0.26 
Gender of household head (1 = male) 0.82 . 0.82 0.81 0.84 
Household size 5.26 2.47 5.14 5.33 0.39 
% income from self-employed agriculture 53.51 38.40 44.86 42.65 0.49 
% income from self-employed nonagriculture 31.23 36.69 31.15 31.33 0.95 
% income from trade activities 5.78 17.39 5.19 6.14 0.51 
% income from salaried activity 14.69 31.46 12.59 15.94 0.20 
Distance to nearest pole (*10 meters) 92.63 107.89 94.61 91.12 0.70 
% high baseline knowledge of electricity 66.09 47.37 65.00 66.66 47.20 
      
Panel 2. Time allocation at baseline*     
Agriculture self-employed 93.26 115.23 94.10 92.82 0.89 
Non-ag self-employed 199.78 160.03 213.34 191.78 0.12 
Household chores 174.73 130.04 166.70 178.83 0.27 
Child care 21.19 49.40 20.43 21.57 0.78 
Time for self 315.61 154.34 307.59 319.69 0.36 
Homework 33.80 55.75 30.75 35.35 0.33 
Entertain visitors 4.61 24.40 3.94 4.95 0.63 
Watch TV/listen to Radio 136.19 106.76 128.75 139.98 0.22 
      
Panel 3. Households’ Neighboring Density     
# neighbors within 10 meters 0.34 0.77 0.35 0.34 0.88 
# neighbors within 20 meters 0.96 1.65 0.90 0.98 0.54 
# neighbors within 30 meters 1.82 2.87 1.77 1.84 0.78 
# neighbors within 40 meters 2.84 4.56 2.77 2.88 0.78 
# neighbors within 50 meters 4.03 6.51 3.85 4.12 0.61 
# neighbors within 60 meters 5.15 8.05 4.96 5.24 0.67 
# neighbors within 70 meters 6.33 9.28 6.09 6.45 0.63 
# neighbors within 80 meters 7.46 10.21 7.35 7.53 0.83 
# neighbors within 90 meters 8.62 11.05 8.59 8.68 0.92 
# neighbors within 100 meters 9.72 11.64 9.93 9.74 0.84 
      
Note: ETB = Ethiopian birr. 
* Time aggregated for up to four respondents per household and divided by the number of respondents 
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Figure 1—Households’ locations and connection status, example from a southern Ethiopian 
village 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
Table 2—Reduced form 
Size of radius: 10-meter 30-meter 50-meter 100-meter 200-meter 300-meter 400-meter 500-meter 
Panel A         
# hh voucher 0.118 0.025 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 
recipient in radius (0.010)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Panel B         
# hh voucher 0.093 0.020 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 
recipient in radius (0.027)** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Above median  0.068 0.054 0.079 0.065 0.096 0.094 0.063 0.070 
density radius (0.054) (0.043) (0.033)* (0.049) (0.054) (0.049)* (0.059) (0.052) 
Panel C         
# hh voucher 0.104 0.019 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 
recipient in radius (0.026)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Above median  0.008 0.031 0.054 0.057 0.076 0.087 0.082 0.089 
density radius (0.055) (0.043) (0.026)* (0.038) (0.050) (0.056) (0.048) (0.049) 
hh received 10%  0.116 0.117 0.115 0.123 0.128 0.130 0.131 0.134 
voucher (0.093) (0.096) (0.094) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097) (0.096) (0.098) 
hh received 20%  0.141 0.135 0.138 0.142 0.144 0.144 0.151 0.152 
voucher (0.074)* (0.071) (0.072)* (0.075)* (0.075)* (0.075)* (0.072)* (0.071)* 
Distance to  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
nearest pole (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Daily consump. 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.020 
(*1000) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Age hh head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
hh head is male 0.107 0.112 0.110 0.117 0.116 0.118 0.123 0.124 
 (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** 
hh size 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
N 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 
OLS (linear probability) estimate. Dependent variable is whether household has connected to the electrical grid over the course of the study. 
Robust standard errors clustered at village-level in parentheses.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 3- first stage estimates 
Size of radius: 10-meter 30-meter 50-meter 100-meter 200-meter 300-meter 400-meter 500-meter 
Panel A         
# hh voucher 0.869 0.796 0.821 0.817 0.797 0.732 0.641 0.565 
recipient in radius (0.040)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.055)*** (0.138)*** (0.223)** (0.273)* 
Panel B         
# hh voucher 0.876 0.799 0.822 0.817 0.798 0.727 0.626 0.551 
recipient in radius (0.036)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.055)*** (0.139)*** (0.208)** (0.248)* 
Above median  -0.019 -0.032 -0.036 -0.012 -0.084 0.247 -2.384 -3.006 
density radius (0.018) (0.043) (0.044) (0.076) (0.258) (0.401) (1.731) (2.063) 
Panel C         
# hh voucher 0.865 0.796 0.824 0.814 0.795 0.735 0.629 0.566 
recipient in radius (0.039)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.047)*** (0.112)*** (0.168)*** (0.204)** 
Above median  -0.020 -0.056 -0.075 -0.071 -0.353 -0.311 -2.514 -2.838 
density radius (0.023) (0.059) (0.073) (0.100) (0.360) (0.446) (1.529) (1.701) 
hh received 10%  0.023 0.018 0.045 0.184 0.437 0.742 0.759 0.839 
voucher (0.036) (0.030) (0.028) (0.128) (0.343) (0.549) (0.549) (0.586) 
hh received 20%  0.036 0.059 0.089 0.187 0.310 0.395 0.127 0.163 
voucher (0.034) (0.037) (0.060) (0.136) (0.229) (0.265) (0.159) (0.211) 
Distance to  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 -0.014 
nearest pole (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Daily consump. -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.019 -0.066 -0.104 -0.099 -0.115 
(*1000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.057) (0.085) (0.069) (0.079) 
Age hh head -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.028 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
hh head is male 0.011 0.009 -0.011 0.048 0.216 0.426 0.283 0.344 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.026) (0.066) (0.216) (0.370) (0.251) (0.267) 
hh size -0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.066 -0.116 -0.134 -0.113 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.070) (0.117) (0.120) (0.110) 
N 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 
OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the number of connected neighbors within a given distance radius from one’s house.  
Robust standard errors clustered at village-level in parentheses.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 4 – Instrumental variable estimates 
Size of radius: 10-meter 30-meter 50-meter 100-meter 200-meter 300-meter 400-meter 500-meter 
Panel A         
# hh connected 0.137 0.031 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 
in radius (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)* (0.003) (0.005) 
Panel B         
# hh connected 0.107 0.026 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 in radius (0.029)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Above median  0.069 0.055 0.079 0.065 0.096 0.093 0.072 0.079 
density radius (0.054) (0.043) (0.033)** (0.049) (0.053) (0.049)* (0.058) (0.050) 
Panel C         
# hh connected 0.120 0.024 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 
in radius (0.029)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Above median  0.010 0.033 0.055 0.057 0.077 0.087 0.093 0.099 
density radius (0.055) (0.043) (0.026)* (0.038) (0.050) (0.056) (0.049) (0.050)* 
hh received 10%  0.114 0.116 0.114 0.123 0.127 0.129 0.128 0.131 
voucher (0.092) (0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.097) 
hh received 20%  0.136 0.133 0.138 0.142 0.143 0.143 0.151 0.152 
voucher (0.072) (0.071) (0.071)* (0.075)* (0.074)* (0.074)* (0.072)* (0.071)* 
Distance to  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
nearest pole (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Daily consump. 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 
(*1000) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Age hh head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
hh head is male 0.105 0.111 0.111 0.117 0.116 0.117 0.122 0.123 
 (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** 
hh size 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
N 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 
Instrumental variable estimates. Dependent variable is whether household has connected to the electrical grid over the course of the study. Number of households connected 
within radius instrumented by number of voucher recipients within that radius. Robust standard errors clustered at village-level in parentheses.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
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Table 5—Households’ perceptions of electricity benefits 
 (1) (2) 
 % strongly 
agree* 
% citation as in 
main three 
benefits** 
Panel 1. Advantages   
Electricity provides better illumination than kerosene oil. 97.0 69.8 
Reading is easier with electric lamps than with kerosene lamps. 97.3 22.4 
With electricity, children would study more at night. 93.0 30.0 
In the electric light, one feels secure at night. 90.0 18.9 
Electric lamps do not cause health hazard like kerosene lamps do. 92.2 52.7 
Running TV by electricity is less expensive than by battery. 86.2 22.0 
It is difficult to work at night without electricity. 82.2 20.8 
It is easier to entertain guests in the evening if there is electricity. 95.3 16.9 
Electricity is important for our local water supply. 81.0 14.9 
Cooking with electricity does not cause smoke. 89.2 13.2 
Life would be much easier with electricity. 87.3 8.2 
   
Panel 2. Disadvantages   
Children would waste their reading time by watching TV. 26.1 61.1 
Electricity often causes accidents that may lead one to death. 54.4 84.7 
Cooking with electricity is not very convenient. 9.5 39.6 
Electricity is very expensive . 17.1 45.8 
Accessories (bulbs/meters) are very expensive in electricity. 18.8 37.1 
Electricity supply is often irregular and low voltage. 9.0 23.2 
   
Notes: 
* Response choices varied between “strongly agrees,” “tends to agree,” “tends to disagree,” ‘”strongly 
disagrees,” and “does not know.” The percentage of “does not know” answers averages 2.8 percent of 
the answers and never exceeds 10 percent. 
** Within each panel, respondents were asked to identify the three most important advantages that they 
perceived from electricity from among the proposed statements. That is: respondents were first asked to 
cite the three main advantages, and later the three main disadvantages. Column 2 reports the percentage 
of households who reported the item as one of the three main advantages (disadvantages) of electricity. 
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Table 6—Bandwagon effect on households with higher/lower knowledge of electricity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Radius 10-meter 30-meter 50-meter 100-meter 200-meter 300-meter 400-meter 500-meter 
 
 Panel A. Subsample of households with highest knowledge of electricity at baseline
# hh connected in 0.168 0.049 0.021 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.000 
radius (0.063)** (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) 
N 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372
         
 Panel B. Subsample of households with lower knowledge of electricity at baseline
# hh connected in 0.058 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.005 0.005 
radius (0.056) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
         
N 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 
Robust standard errors clustered at village-level in parentheses.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Reported are second stage of 2SLS estimates. All estimates include the same set of controls as in Panel C of Tables 2, 3 and 4
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Table 7— Electric installation capacities 
 
 % connected 
households with … 
lighting points 
% connected 
households with 
… socket outlets 
% connected households 
with … 
motor/fridge/heater/stove 
socket 
0 0.00 49.11 99.64 
1 19.93 36.30 0.36 
2 29.54 12.10 0.00 
3 22.42 2.14 0.00 
4 15.30 0.36 0.00 
> 4 12.81 0.00 0.00 
    
 
 
Table 8— Use of electrical light 
Categories 1st usage 2nd 
usage 
3rd 
usage 
1 Reading/studying  56.52 57.42 35.72 
2 Other domestic uses (light for eating, cooking, entertaining friends, and so on) 38.27 30.69 57.14 
3 Home business (handicraft, weaving, sewing, trading, and so on) 5.22 11.88 7.15 
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Table 9—Impact of electrification on Time Allocation 
  OLS coefficients 
(Standard errors) 
2SLS coefficients 
(Standard errors) 
  (1) (2) 
   
Dependent variable :  Change between Round 2 and Round 1 in per capita time (in mn) allocated to… (cf notes)
Agriculture self-employed  -6.36 7.63
  (9.98) (89.57)
   
Non-ag self-employed 20.22 58.50 
 (15.87) (132.08) 
   
Household chores  0.49 -69.28
  (10.76) (98.76)
   
Child care  -0.56 -52.82
  (5.79) (51.09)
   
Time for self  22.11 16.63
  (16.78) (143.97)
   
Homework  1.59 -71.97
  (5.56) (50.34)
   
Entertain visitors  0.29 -7.17
  (2.71) (22.26)
   
Watch TV/listen to Radio  2.41 -1.17
  (11.26) (92.85)
   
   
Notes: 
- Total change was aggregated for up to four respondents per household and divided by the number of respondents. 
- Each cell reports the estimated coefficient associated to connection at round 2, in a separate estimation including 
Consumption/expenditure, Household head’s age and gender, household size, sources of income and distance to the 
nearest pole as additional control variables (coefficients not reported). 
- Column (2): connection instrumented by households’ voucher status (recipient/non-recipient). 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
